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Introduction
M
ultilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and regional banks
routinely use simpler, but practical financing gap models to guide policy
discussions and resource mobilisation. Frequently used by these institutions is
the Two-Gap model, which is rooted in the works of Domar (1939), Harrod
(1946, 1947), and Chenery and Strout (1966). The Two-Gap model is the pre-
cursor and foundation of more elaborated growth models (starting from Solow-
Swan, leading to modern endogenous growth models). The intuition behind the
Two-Gap model can be easily explained by considering the well-known national in-
come identity from the demand and supply sides:
Y is total output produced in a given year (GDP). C is private consumption. I stands for
total investment and G the government consumption. X denotes exports, while M repre-
sents imports. S is savings and T stands for total government tax revenue. Rearranging, we
get an equation explaining total resource gap of an economy into internal balance (government bud-
get) and external gap (balance of trade), such that:
(1)
(2)
It is clear from equation (2) that the most binding constraints are either the savings gap (left hand side) or the foreign ex-
change gap (external finance gap). The government budget deficit is mainly driven by one of these gaps.  According to the
Two-Gap model, the required external finance is the larger of these gaps. In the absence of any external or internal finan-
cing sources, such as borrowing or aid, supply and demand side of the economy should be in equilibrium. Thus, if coun-
tries are left to their own devices, particularly poor ones, attaining equilibrium is certainly a simple matter of necessity, but
with a huge price. Economic stagnation, or even economic regression, may arise. This is where Chenery and Strout (1966)
brought in foreign aid as a vehicle to support a certain target growth rate.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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To do that, the Two-Gap model borro-
wed from the Harrod-Domar (HD) model
the simple theory of economic growth,
where GDP (Y) grows proportionately
with investment, the factor of proportio-
nality being the Incremental Capital Out-
put Ratio (ICOR) or marginal product of
capital,  which  is  assumed  to  be
constant. The higher ICOR is, the lower
a country needs to invest to reach a cer-
tain growth rate and vice versa1. The rest
of the computation is a matter of details
in how imports, exports, savings, and
investment feature in the analysis.2 The
hallmark of the Two-Gap model is that
economic growth is driven by capital ac-
cumulation or investment, particularly in
the short-run. Secondly, there is a one-
to-one relation between foreign aid and
investment. 
The application of the HD model and its
extension in the Two-Gap model in a de-
veloping country context dates back to
the  early  1950s,  where  development
planning was still fashionable. Most no-
table was India, which extended the HD
into a multi-sector growth model with a
number of innovations to capture seve-
ral deficiencies for practical use. The
World Bank still uses this model with re-
levant adaptation, taking into account
other features of a developing economy.
Currently, the model is called Revised
Minimum Standard Model, where debt or
government deficit enters explicitly in the
analysis so that instead of two gaps,
there are three.
The HD growth model was eventually
overtaken by its extended version — the
Two-Gap model — which thrived among
planners in the developing world and
among multinational lending institutions,
particularly the World Bank. Solow and
others (Swan, Ramsey, Diamond) for-
mulated a growth model in the neo-clas-
sical spirit, where the production func-
tion  (supply  side)  drove  economic
growth with emphasis on labour and to-
tal factor productivity, and attendant as-
sumptions, such as diminishing returns
to factors of production. These were ab-
sent in the HD model.  Easterly (1999)
summarises the key shortfalls of the mo-
del at both theoretical and empirical le-
vels. Why then, does a model that has
been out of favour in the theoretical
growth literature continue to dominate
policy making in the real world?
There are a number of considerations
that still make the HD framework attrac-
tive for policy making. First, it deals with
short-run planning problems, while most
growth models that have theoretical ap-
peal and some degree of sophistication
deal with long-run growth. The distinc-
tion is very important in application. The
issue of long-run or short-run is not
about timeframe. It is about an economy
reaching its equilibrium or steady state
over a certain period of time, or to be
specific, zero per capita growth or GDP
growing at the rate of population growth.
Here, ICOR can be conveniently assu-
med to be constant. One can also easily
obtain the growth rate required to sup-
port a constant per capita income level.
From a policy perspective, this is not at-
tractive. Secondly, most developing eco-
nomies, particularly those in Africa, are
far from reaching a stable equilibrium,
even over an extended period (see for
example, Berthlemy 2005). For instance,
one of the star performers of SSA, which
is Ghana, never managed to reach a
steady state over 47 years (Figure 1).
Thus, the transitional dynamics become
complicated for policy makers to handle,
even as they try to use a much refined
growth model. 
The other factor that sustains the use-
fulness of HD is the lack of alternative
models that can fit the needs of policy-
makers and practitioners like develop-
ment banks, especially in dealing with
short to medium-term financing needs.
As the saying goes, “it takes a model to
beat a model”3. Countries continue to
use Leontief type input-output models
and Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs),
which in spirit, are close to the HD spe-
cification in terms of proportionality bet-
ween input (investment) and output.
Most macro-econometric models re-
quire estimates of ICOR to compute fi-
nancing gaps, whether they are formu-
lated  in  the  structural  approach  or
neo-classical framework. 
Finally, the HD approach provides a use-
ful benchmark – a first-order approxi-
mation to the complicated task of esti-
mating  financing  needs  for
de  velop  ment.  It  allows  a  check  on
consistency across the macroeconomic
balances as well as sectoral investment
programmes.
Critiques of the Two-Gap Model
1 In neo-classical models, the ICOR is commonly interpreted as a measure of the quality of investment.
2 See for instance http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=the+two-gap+model&aq=f&oq=&aqi= for a nice guide on the model.
3 “The other-worldly philosophers”, The Economist July 18, 2009, p. 68.
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4 Easterly, W., 1999. “The ghost of financing gap: Testing the growth model used in the international financial institutions.” Journal of Development Economics,
60 (2) 423-438.
For AfDB, comparing financing require-
ments based on alternative models and
approaches could be an exercise worth
the effort. However, HD may continue to
be relevant when time and resources are
limited. Usually, the resource require-
ments generated by HD are the lowest
possible, given its assumptions, which
are: (1) Investment is proportional to
growth of output. This leaves out issues
of investment allocative and productive
inefficiencies; and (2) Foreign aid is pro-
portional to investment. This ignores is-
sues of inefficiencies and leakages of
aid. 
In a typical developing country, ineffi-
ciencies in both the aid-investment and
investment-growth linkages imply that
the actual resource requirements are lar-
ger than the amounts generated from
the straightforward HD model. Indeed,
while consistent broadly with other esti-
mates, ECON’s estimates of resource
requirements for Africa are generally on
the low end (Table 1).
In analysing the empirical validity of HD in
the  African  context,  Easterly  (1999)4
found no empirical basis to support the
predictions of the HD in over 138 coun-
tries for the 1950-1992 period. The key
predictions of the HD model are that aid
promotes investment. It assumes that a
one-to-one relationship exists between
the two. It also assumes that investment
(one period lagged) leads to high growth
in the next period. 
Setting aside issues of model specifica-
tion and others, we attempted to re-exa-
mine these relationships for a sample of
12 African countries. We were unable to
replicate Easterly’s findings. Our results
actually suggest strong support for both
predictions. Except for two countries,
we found significant relationships bet-
ween growth and investment for the 10
countries when a constant is added in
the OLS regression. This is because the
HD model assumes no constant term in
the relationship between growth and in-
vestment (proportionality). In all cases,
zero constant was accepted. Once we
impose a zero constant on the regres-
sions, it turns out that all countries exhi-
bit a strong and positive short-term rela-
tionship  between  investment  and
growth. The relationship between aid
and investment is also found to be posi-
tive, and in most cases, significant. Ex-
tending this analysis to all African coun-
tries would be interesting.
Finally, it is argued that HD ignores dimi-
nishing returns to aid. This is true so long
as  diminishing  returns  to  investment
exist, since both are proportionately re-
lated. But the existence of diminishing re-
turns implies that the straightforward HD
projections will underestimate the actual
resource requirements. 
To summarise, the AfDB, as well as other
institutions, continue to use various me-
thodologies to estimate resource requi-
rements for developing countries. Any of
these methodologies has its own limita-
tions in relation to empirical application to
country-specific and context-specific cir-
cumstances. Nonetheless, estimates ge-
nerated from simple models like the HD
turn out to be very consistent with esti-
mates generated by more sophisticated
methodologies. As can be seen in Table
1, ECON’s estimates of financing gaps
using the HD model are indeed similar to
those from other institutions and authors.
If anything, the ECON estimates are on
the low end.
The way forward 
Table 1: Various estimates of financing gaps for African countries
Institution Source (Report/paper) Africa Date Main results Methodology
World Bank Global Economic Prospects
(GEP)





External financing requirements for all
developing countries as a group are anti-
cipated to increase to $1.3 trillion in
2009. Africa represents 5.52% of total
developing countries GDP, implying an
FG for Africa of $71.82 billion. In addi-
tion, based on the 4% of GDP deficit in
2009, Africa would need an external fi-
nancing of $60.76 billion.
ICOR or Fiscal Deficit forecasts
IMF The Implications of the Glo-
bal Financial Crisis for Low-
Income Countries
$51.40bn Net external fi-
nancing (an estimate in
the BoP framework)
3-Mar-09 The total balance of payment shock will
cost Low-Income Countries (LICs) in
Africa about $150 billion in 2009. Adding
the impact on Africa’s 14 middle-income
countries, this figure could easily rise to
above $200-250 billion.




Exorcism of the Ghost. An
Alternative Growth Model for
Measuring the Financing Gap
$152bn/year 2000 For an objective of reaching a 7%
growth, the FG would be around 10% of
GDP, which corresponds to $152 billion
in the most conservative case (other as-
sumptions imply larger FG).
Measuring the capital inflows necessary
to fill the export-import gap as a domi-
nant constraint on output growth
ECON G20 Paper $50bn - $117bn (2009) 2009 $50bn to reach pre-crisis growth; $117
to reach 7% growth
ICOR; assume 7% MDG-required
growth for all countries
ECON GCI input $52bn 2009 Required growth to reach MDGs, net of
current aid 
ICOR; consider country-specific MDG-
required growth
ADB/GCI GCI paper $90bn (2009) 2009 Infrastructure gap Assume 15% GDP investment target;
use AEO growth projections for
2009/2010; use baseline of average
2000-2008 growth rate for 2010-2020A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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